Central Communication Port - expensive construction mistakes

Audit no. P/24/017/KGP

The Central Communication Port (CPK) is the biggest investment of that kind in the Central and Eastern Europe. The planned transport hub between Warsaw and Łódź is to integrate air, road and rail transport (transfer between CPK and the largest Polish cities within not more than 2.5 hours). The airport is to be located 37 km to the west from Warsaw and cover the area of approx. 3 thousand ha. According to the plans made in 2023 – it is expected to handle 40 million passengers per year. The investment assumed creating over 150 thousand new jobs and its total costs were initially estimated at about PLN 35–45 billion. The airport construction was planned to start in 2023.  

The NIK audit was conducted from December 2024 to May 2025. It covered the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for the Central Communication Port at the Ministry of Infrastructure (the Plenipotentiary), Centralny Port Komunikacyjny sp. z o.o. (the Company) and Polskie Porty Lotnicze S.A. (PPL).

Unrealistic assumptions

The Government Plenipotentiary for the Central Communication Port in 2021–2023 improperly supervised preparation and implementation of the CPK Programme in terms of the airport construction by Centralny Port Komunikacyjny sp. z o.o. In the draft CPK Programme for 2024–2030 filed with the Council of Ministers in 2023 the Plenipotentiary did not include the analyses and forecasts developed in 2019–2023 (1^st half). He set expired, unrealistic and unfeasible deadlines: for the CPK construction (2027), the CPK handover (2028) and investment expenditures (nearly PLN 43 billion) and the throughput of the airport in the initial phase of its functioning (40 million passengers per year).  

NIK points out that the Plenipotentiary has not ensured timely development of documents related to the implementation of the CPK Programmes. The CPK Company prepared the first document on the CPK Programme implementation for 2024-2030 with a 14-month delay, whereas the implementation document on the updated CPK Programme for 2024-2032 was not drafted by the end of the audit, which made up a 5-month delay. In that way, the Plenipotentiary failed to exercise sufficient supervision over the Company’s implementation of the CPK Programme.

Financing sources and investment spending

The funds planned to be obtained to finance the CPK Programme for 2020-2023 totalled PLN 12.8 billion, including PLN 9.2 billion from the issue of Treasury securities. In total, until the end of 2023, CPK sp. z o.o. received T-bonds with the face value of nearly PLN 5.9 billion to finance tasks as part of the CPK Programme for 2020–2023. In 2023, the State Treasury made an in-kind contribution with CPK sp. z o.o. of 100% PPL shares worth PLN 6.4 billion. In its balance-sheet at the end of 2023, the Company reported equity of PLN 12.3 billion. The Company did not acquire any commercial financing by the end of 2024,.

At the end of 2023, as part of the CPK Programme for 2020-2023, the total of PLN 1.3 billion was spent on the airport-related tasks from the planned amount of PLN 7.7 billion (which makes 16%). The Company’s operating cost were approx. PLN 186 million. In 2024, the total of PLN 633 million, i.e. about 10% of the amount planned in the CPK Programme for 2024-2030, was spent on the implementation of that Programme.

Risky strategic partner

The CPK construction and financing required finding a strategic investor that would be willing to invest funds of approx. PLN 9 billion. In December 2024, Polskie Porty Lotnicze S.A. was selected as a potential strategic investor for the construction and management of the Central Communication Port. The Company was expected to make a share contribution of up to about PLN 9 billion. According to NIK there is a risk, though, that PPL may not be able to contribute those funds due to its financial situation. This risk needs to be considered in the context of the Company’s essential expenditures for the modernisation of Warsaw Chopin Airport (about PLN 900 million) and charging PPL’s bottom-line with the loss of approx. PLN 800 million due to the expansion of Warsaw-Radom Airport and losses generated by this airport following its handover in April 2023 (of nearly PLN 70 million).

The key task was not completed - the decision on the location was not obtained.  Only on 8 January 2025 (with a 15-month delay), the decision in the first instance was issued. This decision is needed to file construction permit requests concerning the CPK infrastructure and its facilities. Also, it allows the Company to take over the property in real terms.

No money for the expansion of Okęcie and Modlin airports while millions spent on Warsaw-Radom Airport

Polskie Porty Lotnicze S.A. spent over PLN 738 million on the construction of Warsaw-Radom Airport, without economic rationale. At the same time, the Company incurred a loss of PLN 67.5 million due to the airport operation in 2023–2024. Excessive air traffic was to be transferred from Chopin Airport to a complementary airport which in 2018 PPL S.A. selected to be – without reason - the airport in Radom. That decision was taken based on unrealistic, extremely optimistic air traffic forecasts for the Radom airport, assuming an increase from 2 million passengers annually in 2023 to 7 million per year in 2035, whereas the estimated maximum trafficability at this airport was about 0.5 million passengers per year.

Also in 2024, Polskie Porty Lotnicze S.A. lost revenues estimated at PLN 210 million. The loss resulted from the former CEO’s unjustified withdrawal from the modernisation of Warsaw Chopin Airport in 2019 and the former PPL CEOs’ disapproval of the development of Modlin Airport in 2019–2023. The decisions taken by subsequent PPL CEOs to withdraw and then suspend investments to increase the throughput of Warsaw–Modlin Airport resulted in 2024 in the loss of revenues of approx. PLN 83 million. According to PPL’s estimates, in 2025–2027 the Company may also lose revenues, this time of about PLN 226 million. According to NIK the withdrawal from planned and previously approved investments related to Warsaw–Modlin Airport was groundless and aimed at the airport closing. That was also an attempt to influence carriers to transfer flight connections to the airport in Radom.

Chopin Airport – blatant wastefulness and lost revenues

In 2021–2023, the Plenipotentiary did not take efforts to improve the throughput of Warsaw Chopin Airport. That was inconsistent with the CPK Concept of 2017 which stated that Okęcie Airport was to ensure the maximum available throughput until the time of the CPK opening so that the entire passenger traffic generated there could go to the Central Communication Port. Therefore, the Minister of Infrastructure’s withdrawal from the investments planned and approved in 2019 to improve the throughput of Warsaw Chopin Airport was unjustified and wasteful. It also had negative impact on possible development of the flight connection network of the national carrier PLL LOT S.A., which would translate into the CPK profitability directly after its opening.

Today Warsaw Chopin Airport is struggling with the worsening problem of exhausting throughput in the dynamically growing market. This is also linked to high revenues for PPL, as it was the case with the non-modernised parking, which was finally closed. According to NIK that was a wasteful activity which resulted in PPL losing revenues in 2023–2025 of approx. PLN 34 million.

To sum up, NIK stands in a position that the project of preparation and construction of the Central Communication Port is still carrying numerous risks without any guarantee that the airport will be handed over in 2032. The project is very sensitive to changes in key parameters, such as: the number of handled passengers, the volume of investment expenditures or the level of airport fees.

Recommendations

The NIK audit findings indicate that all the auditees should take urgent steps. Therefore, the Polish SAI has made the following recommendations:

the Government Plenipotentiary for the Central Communication Port to:

• review procedures for supervising the CPK Programme and consider introducing changes to strengthen the Plenipotentiary’s supervision to make sure the tasks specified in the CPK Programme are carried out on time and in line with the assumptions.

the CEO of Centralny Port Komunikacyjny sp. z o.o. to:

• strengthen control and supervision mechanisms to make sure the CPK construction is carried out on time and in line with the assumptions;
• ensure effective control at the stage of implementing support agreements;
• strengthen control and supervision mechanisms for advertising and promotion spending.

the CEO of Polskie Porty Lotnicze S.A. to:

• strengthen the mechanisms of supervision and control over the planning and implementation of investment processes;
• intensify activities to implement investments related to the modernisation of Warsaw Chopin Airport in terms of adapting its throughput to the assumptions of the CPK Programme for 2024–2032;
• optimise operating costs and strengthen the customer acquisition process at Warsaw-Radom Airport;
• develop the model of the Warsaw-Modlin Airport operation, desirable from the viewpoint of PPL, including the amount of capital commitment in its expansion and throughput increase to properly manage and coordinate air traffic in Mazowieckie Province;
• implement supervision and control mechanisms for updating the airport master plans.